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New York, New York
The complaint filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in
SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.," has been described as "the
best-read document since 'Gone With the Wind.'-"2 The action is sig-
nificant and unprecedented not only because it is the first such action
against a major law firm, but even more importantly because it posits
novel theories as to the duties and obligations of lawyers, which would
appear to significantly expand their liabilities.
Analysis of Complaint
The party defendants in the National Student Marketing Corp. case,
alleged to have violated various provisions of the Securities Act of 1933
("Securities Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Ex-
change Act"), include the New York law firm of White & Case and
one of its partners, Marion Jay Epley, III ("Epley"); the Chicago law
firm of Lord, Bissel & Brook and two of its partners, Max E. Meyer
("Meyer") and Louis F. Schauer ("Schauer"); Robert A. Katz
("Katz"), a New York attorney; the national accounting firm of Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. ("PMM"), one of its partners, and a former
PMM auditor. The other defendants are National Student Marketing
Corp. ("NSMC"); and nine persons who are officers and directors (in-
cluding the General Counsel) of either NSMC or Interstate National
Corp. ("Interstate") which merged with NSMC on October 31, 1969
and has since operated as a wholly-owned subsidiary. The complaint
alleges a fraudulent scheme resulting in the issuance of approximately
11.2 million unregistered shares of NSMC stock between the fall of
1968 and June of 1970, in 83 separate transactions. During this pe-
riod, the common stock of NSMC was registered with the SEC pursuant
to Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act, and was traded in the over-the-
counter market.
The charges against White & Case and Lord, Bissel & Brook are
based upon their activities in connection with a stock for stock merger
of Interstate into NSMC which occurred on October 31, 1969. Proxy
soliciting material sent to stockholders of Interstate and NSMC seeking
approval of the merger had contained unaudited financial statements
of NSMC for the nine-month period ended May 31, 1969, which re-
*Member of the New York Bar.
1. Civ. Action No. 225-72 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1972).
2. Green, Irate Attorneys-A Bid to Hold Lawyers Accountable to Public
Stuns, Angers Firms, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
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flected net earnings of $700,000. A condition of closing was a state-
ment that PMM had no reason to believe that the unaudited financials
as of May 31, 1969 were not prepared in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles and practices or required any material
adjustments in order that the results of operations be fairly presented.
In addition, PMM's comfort letter was to state that NSMC had not
suffered any material adverse change in its financial position or results
of operations. The comfort letter presented at the closing (which had
been dictated in part over the telephone) stated that PMM's audit for
the year ending August 31, 1969 which was still in progress disclosed
certain significant adjustments which should be reflected retroactive
to May 31, 1969. The contents of the letter were known to White &
Case, counsel for NSMC; Lord, Bissel & Brook, counsel for Inter-
state; their respective defendant partners; NSMC and certain of its
defendant officers and directors; and Interstate and its defendant offi-
cers and directors. Further, at the closing but before the merger was
actually consummated PMM informed White & Case, Epley and the
General Counsel and Secretary of NSMC that PMM wished to add an-
other paragraph to the comfort letter stating that if the necessary ad-justments had been made to NSMC's unaudited consolidated statement
of earnings for the period ended May 31, 1969, NSMC would have
shown a net loss for that period and the consolidated operations as at
May 31, 1969, would show a break-even for the year ended August 31,
1969. About an hour after the closing, PMM informed White & Case
and Epley that it wished to add still another paragraph to its comfort
letter which would state that Interstate and NSMC should consider sub-
mitting corrected interim unaudited financials to stockholders prior to
proceeding with the closing.
When the actual comfort letter was received, White & Case and
Lord, Bissel & Brook issued opinions stating that all steps taken to
consummate the merger had been validly taken and that no violation
had been incurred of any federal or state statute or regulation to the
knowledge of counsel. Lord, Bissel & Brook also issued an opinion
that certain NSMC shares acquired by certain Interstate shareholders
could be sold and such shares were sold on or about October 31, 1969
for approximately $3 million. In this connection, it should be noted
that Meyer was a director of Interstate and he sold NSMC stock. The
PMM comfort letter was mailed to all directors of NSMC and Inter-
state, but its contents were not disclosed to stockholders or otherwise
made public. In October and November 1969, NSMC filed 8-K reports
with the SEC which contained representations as to the fairness, truth-
fulness and accuracy of NSMC's financial statements as of May 31,
1969. White & Case transmitted the reports to the SEC.
The gravamen of the complaint against White & Case and Lord,
Bissel & Brook and their respective defendant partners is their failure
"to refuse to issue their opinions" that all steps taken to consummate
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the merger had been validly taken and "to insist that the financial state-
ments be revised and shareholders be resolicited, and failing that, to
cease representing their respective clients" and notify the SEC "con-
cerning the misleading nature of the nine-month financial statements."
Additionally, Interstate shareholders sold NSMC shares in reliance on
Lord, Bissel & Brook's opinion without disclosing the contents of the
comfort letter. For these acts of omission, NSMC, various of its officers
and directors, PMM, White & Case, Epley, Lord, Bissel & Brook,
Meyer and Schauer are charged with violations of the anti-fraud pro-
visions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act and certain of the
defendants, including White & Case and Epley, are charged with vio-
lations of Sections 13 (a) and 14(a) of the Exchange Act. Various de-
fendants, including White & Case, Epley and Katz, are also charged
with violations of the anti-fraud provisions and Section 13 (a) in con-
nection with the sale of Compujob, Inc., allegedly made after August
31, 1969 for a non-recourse note, as of August 29, 1969, so that NSMC
could include income from the sale in its August 31, 1969 year end
financials. Katz represented the purchasers of Compujob, Inc. and is-
sued opinions relating to such disposition.
The prayer for relief includes requests for an injunction against
White & Case, Epley, Lord, Bissel & Brook, Meyer, Schauer and Katz
from violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act in connection with the purchase or sale of NSMC or any
other issuer, requests for an injunction against White & Case, Epley
and Katz from violation of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act in the
filing of false and misleading annual and other reports, and requests
for an injunction against White & Case and Epley from issuing and
disseminating proxy material for meetings of NSMC or any other per-
son which do not comply with Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act.
The breadth of the prayer for relief is noteworthy. It could transform
an opinion of White & Case erroneously given in some future securities
transaction into contempt of court. Ordinarily injunctions against se-
curities laws violations in the securities upon which the complaint is
based "or any other issuer" are reserved for repeated or notorious
violaters of the law.3 This type of language seems inappropriate to a
case of first impression.
Prior Actions against Attorneys
Prior actions initiated against attorneys by the SEC, directly by way
of Rule 2 (e) disciplinary proceedings, 4 or indirectly by way of criminal
3. See, SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,341,
at 91,860-61 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Seaboard Securities Corp., CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 91,697, at 95,564 (S.D. N.Y. 1966).
4. Rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. §201.2(e), empowers
the SEC to suspend or disbar from appearing or practising before it any attorney
found not to be unqualified or lacking in character or integrity or guilty of un-
ethical or improper professional conduct; or to have willfully violated or aided
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prosecutions, 5 have been unfortunately numerous. However, injunctive
actions are a relatively recent phenomenon and indicate a subtle but
significant shift in the agency's attitude toward the civil liabilities of
attorneys for the securities laws violations of their clients.6 The com-
plaint in the National Student Marketing Corp. case is not significant
or unusual because attorneys are named as defendants. Rather, the
action is noteworthy and troubling because it charges illegal conduct
by the defendants qua attorneys.
Criminal prosecutions of attorneys for securities laws violations have
involved fairly patent frauds, where the defendants demonstrated a
disregard for the law beyond any failure to discharge their professional
obligations. 7 Similarly, SEC disbarment proceedings have ordinarily in-
volved active participation in securities frauds, rather than nonfeasance
or even malpractice.8 The distinction between negligence and willful
misconduct by a professional acting on behalf of clients who are law
violaters can be very nebulous. The work performed by an attorney
in connection with a securities transaction will usually involve the
preparation of a prospectus, proxy solicitation or similar document and
the issuance of an opinion as to the legality of various matters, possibly
including sales of securities. Where such documents contain false or
misleading information, an attorney's liability for such fraud, where
an attorney is acting solely as agent for a client, must necessarily de-
pend upon either actual knowledge of the fraudulent statements, or,
absent such knowledge, a duty to discover the fraud. In a case which
imposed criminal liability upon an attorney, the court noted
"In our complex society the accountant's certificate and the
lawyer's opinion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss
and abetted violations of the federal securities laws. A recent amendment to this
Rule, set forth in Securities Act Release No. 5147 (May 10, 1971), gives the
SEC power to suspend without a preliminary hearing any attorney "perma-
nently enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction by reason of his mis-
conduct in an action brought by the Commission from violation or aiding and
abetting the violation of any provision of the federal securities laws ... or of the
rules and regulations thereunder." Presumably, such violations would not have
to have been willful, and an attorney could be suspended without a hearing for
conduct not sufficiently grevious to justify disbarment.
5. Section 24 of the Securities Act and Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act
provide for criminal penalties for violations of these acts. The SEC transmits
evidence of violations to the Attorney General for criminal prosecution pursuant
to Section 20(b) of the Securities Act and Section 21(e) of the Exchange Act.
6. See generally, Mathews, SEC Civil Injunction Actions, Pt. 1, 5 REV. SEC.
REG. 969 (1972) and cases cited therein.
7. E.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964); United
States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961 ), cert. denied sub. nom. Mittleman
v. United States, 368 U.S. 984 (1962); United States v. Schwartz, CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 93,023 (E.D. N.Y. 1971).
8. E.g., Marshall I. Stewart, Securities Act Release No. 4829 (Apr. 29, 1966);
Morris MacSchwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347 (1960) and 40 S.E.C. 459 (1961); Sol M.
Alpher, 39 S.E.C. 346 (1959). But see, Murray A. Kivitz, Securities Act Release
No. 5163 (June 29, 1971) (suspension for unethical and unprofessional conduct
in allowing a layman to exploit an attorney's privilege to practice before theSEC, acquiescing in improper fee arrangements and including questionable fi-
nancial statements in a registration statement)
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more potent than the chisel or the crowbar. Of course, Congress
did not mean that any mistake of law or misstatement of fact
should subject an attorney or an accountant to criminal liability
simply because more skilled practitioners would not have made
them. But Congress equally could not have intended that men
holding themselves out as members of these ancient professions
should be able to escape criminal liability on a plea of ignorance
when they have shut their eyes to what was plainly to be seen or
have represented a knowledge they knew they did not possess."9
The first injunctive action brought by the SEC against an attorney
based upon false statements in an offering circular (prepared for an
intra-state offering) was Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Frank.10 The false statements concerned a chemical additive designed
to accelerate the curing of rubber. The defendant attorney appealed
from an order of preliminary injunction, taking the position that the
portion of the offering circular containing misrepresentations about
the additive had been prepared by officers of the issuer, and the de-
fendant's function had been only that of a scrivener helping them to
place their ideas in proper form. Although reversing the case for fail-
ure of the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing and make findings,
of fact, the court held that if, as the SEC contended, the defendant
had been furnished with information which even a non-expert would
have recognized as showing the falsity of the misrepresentations in the
offering circular an injunction would have been properly issued. "A
lawyer has no privilege to assist in circulating a statement with regard
to securities which he knows to be false simply because his client has
furnished it to him." Further, a lawyer cannot escape liability for
fraud "by closing his eyes to what he saw and could readily under-
stand."
At the same time, the decision in the Frank case acknowledges that
platitudes from conspiracy cases about liability for misrepresentations
in securities sales literature do not adequately deal with the issue of
whether an attorney who plays no role except that of counsel in draft-
ing such literature can be held liable under the anti-fraud provisions of
,the securities acts. Whether such provisions "require a lawyer passing
on an offering circular to run down possible infirmities in his client's
story of which he has been put on notice, and if so, what efforts are
required of him, is a closer question on which it is important that the
9. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964).
10. 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968). In SEC v. A. G. Bellin Securities Corp.,
171 F. Supp. 233 (S.D. N.Y. 1959) an attorney was enjoined from further vio-
lations of the Securities Act. The attorney had purchased the stock certificates
and records of a shell corporation, the unregistered shares of which were shortly
thereafter distributed to the public. The attorney engaged a transfer agent and
participated in making marketing arrangements with brokers. Although he argued
that whatever he did was done solely, on behalf of and pursuant to instructions
of his clients, he never disclosed the identity of any such clients. The court clearly
held him liable as a principal in the transactions, rather than as an attorney.
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court be seized of the precise facts, including the extent . . . to which
[the defendant's] role went beyond a lawyer's normal one."11
A harbinger of the National Student Marketing case was the com-
plaint filed in SEC v. Everest Management Corp.,1 2 which charged 44
defendants with 45 separate counts of securities fraud, centering around
the market manipulation of a number of stocks, through various mu-
tual funds and hedge funds to the detriment of the investors in such
funds, and the embezzlement by certain persons of the assets of some
of the funds. Two defendants named in the complaint are attorneys.
One of them was secretary, counsel and shareholder of defendant
Microthermal Applications, Inc. ("Microthermal").
Microthermal in July 1969 had a registered public offering of its
common stock and received proceeds of approximately $650,000,
about $500,000 of which the SEC alleged was misappropriated, con-
verted and dissipated by three of the defendants. The company's coun-
sel is charged with engaging in a scheme with other defendants to
make it appear that such proceeds had been invested in U.S. Treasury
bills and bank certificates of deposit. As part of this scheme, documents
were prepared and entries made purporting to show the purchase of
$500,000 in CD's, and Microthermal then entered into a transaction
with defendant United States Secretarial Institute, Ltd. ("U.S. Secre-
tarial") in which certain securities of U.S. Secretarial, which were
worthless, were purportedly sold to Microthermal for $375,000 in
nonexistent bank CD's. The attorney and other defendants allegedly
arranged to have false certified financial statements prepared for Micro-
thermal, for the payment of $10,000 and caused a New York City bank
to issue letters and other documents falsely confirming the purported
purchase of the bank CD's. The false financial statements were filed
with the SEC as part of a Form 10-K report. To gain additional time
for these illegal efforts, counsel requested an extension of time from
the SEC for the filing of the Form 10-K, on the false ground that certain
accounting records 'had been temporarily lost. The attorney and other
defendants are also charged with having caused Microthermal to fail
to file subsequent Form 10-K, Form 8-K, Form 9-K and Form 10-Q
reports. As a result of such activities, counsel is alleged to have vio-
lated the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act and Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act and various rules there-
under.
The rationale of the Frank decision is very similar to the rationale
of Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.13 insofar as it imposed lia-
11. 388 F.2d at 489.
12. Civ. Action No. 71-4932 (S.D. N.Y. Nov. 11, 1971). See also, SEC v.Fields, Civ. Action No. 71-5416 (S.D. N.Y. Dec. 13, 1971), an injunctive action
against an attorney who wrote over 65 opinion letters allegedly permitting un-
registered shares of the stock of four corporations to be illegally distributed to
the public.
13. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
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bility upon an attorney who was an outside director of a corporation
for false statements in the corporation's prospectus. The court held
that although the attorney was not an expert within the meaning of
Section 11 of the Securities Act, he failed to establish his due diligence
defenses because there were too many instances where he failed to
make inquiry he could easily have made which, if pursued, would have
put him on his guard. x4 The court in the Frank case viewed the defend-
ant as an insider who played more of a role than is customarily played
by outside counsel. This subtle but significant difference between the
role of outside counsel and the role of a lawyer who is an insider, either
by virtue of being a corporate director or otherwise, could prove im-
portant in the development of the law in this area. The SEC's action
against counsel for Microthermal for violations of the Exchange Act's
filing requirements could be based upon his role as Secretary, as well
as counsel to the company, although the office of secretary is minis-
terial and not policy making.
In the National Student Marketing case, however, no distinction
seems to have been made between the attorney who is also an officer
or director and the attorney who is solely outside counsel. Although
Meyer was a director of Interstate, Schauer was not and Epley and
White & Case had no connection to NSMC except that of counsel.
Rather, the violations of the filing requirements charged in the Na-
tional Student Marketing case are essentially that the attorneys for
NSMC and Interstate discovered that false financial statements had
been filed by NSMC with the SEC and they did nothing to correct this
situation.
In one recent case involving directors' liability, failure to act was
deemed participation in a securities law violation.15 In another case,
directors were held liable for not discovering a fraud perpetrated by
other directors. 16 Two cases do not constitute a trend, 17 and it does
not and should not follow that the securities law liabilities of directors
and attorneys should be the same. However, the elision between the
two types of liability may be tempting to plaintiffs, including the SEC.
Holding attorneys to the high ethical standards suggested in the Na-
tional Student Marketing complaint has an easy public interest appeal
which is difficult to criticize. Nevertheless, the idea that an attorney
14. Id. at 683, 689-92. See also, Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,163, at 91,194-96 (S.D. N.Y. 1971) (liability of
attorney who was an inside director for omissions in prospectus).
15. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind.
1968), afl'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969). Cf. Black & Co. v. Nova-Tech, Inc.,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,289 (D. Ore. 1971) (failure by counsel to notify
plaintiff that securities were unregistered under Blue Sky statute held an "act"
under Rule lOb-5).
16. Heit v. Bixby, 276 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1967).
17. See, Wessel v. Buhler, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,929 (9th Cir. 1971)




has a duty to the SEC or the public to investigate the information he
receives from his clients in connection with an SEC registration state-
ment or other filing and disclose any falsities discovered could prove
inimical to existing attorney-client relationships.
The Canons of Legal Ethics
Canon 4 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility requires
a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client, an ethical
obligation which is broader than the attorney-client privilege and exists
without regard to the nature or source of information or the fact that
others share the knowledge.' 8 Further, "secrets" refers to any informa-
tion gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested
to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing
or would be likely to be detrimental to the client. 19 The public interest
in protecting the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship is
insuring the right of every person to freely and fully confer with and
confide in an attorney, which right requires freedom from fear of re-
vealment of matters disclosed. 20
A lawyer's duty to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client
can come into conflict with other duties which are also important to the
administration of justice. A lawyer may reveal the intention of a client
to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.
Further, he must make such a disclosure if the facts in the attorney's
possession indicate beyond reasonable doubt that a crime will be com-
mitted.21 A closely related canon provides that
"A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpe-
trated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call
upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses
or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal.
(2) A person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon
a tribunal shall promptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal."
(Footnotes omitted) .22
The conflict between the duties of confidentiality and candor was
recognized in an inquiry to the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics
as to whether an attorney who secured a divorce for a client should re-
veal the truth to the court when the client informed him that he com-
18. EC 4-4.
19. DR 4-101(A).
20. Ellis-Foster Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 159 F. Supp. 917
(D.N.J. 1958); DRINKER, LEGAL EThiCS 132-33 (1953).
21. DR 4-101(c)(3) and notes thereto.
22. DR 7-101(B). A recent New York State Bar Association opinion has
interpreted this canon as imposing no affirmative duty on a lawyer to disclose
information to a government agency unless fraud is involved. N.Y. State Opinion
207 (1971-).
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mitted perjury in securing the divorce concerning the date his wife de-
serted him. The Committee held (5-2) that the attorney's duty of
candor and fairness to the court was not sufficient to override his duty
to preserve his client's confidences. Although the attorney should urge
his client to make the disclosure, if the client will not take his advice,
the attorney should have nothing further to do with the client but should
not disclose the facts to the court or to the authorities. 23 In a similar
situation involving fraud by the executor of an estate, the Committee
on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York distinguished between fraud upon the court which
the attorney might be perpetuating by his silence in failing to correct
his own prior statements to the court, and fraud upon the estate. The
attorney could properly tell the surrogate about matters necessary to
set right mistakes which the attorney had made unwittingly, but not
about other matters which he had discovered even though such matters
constituted a fraud.24
The difficulties of delineating between the duty of a lawyer to remain
silent and the duty to speak in situations involving a fraud upon a court,
are increased in situations involving representation of clients before
administrative agencies. In such situations it is not always clear whether
the lawyer is acting as advocate or adviser, 25 just as it is not always clear
whether the agency is acting as legislator, prosecutor or judge. These
difficulties are recognized in ABA Opinion 314, which generally dis-
cusses the ethical obligations of a lawyer in practice before the Inter-
nal Revenue Service and states:
"In all cases, with regard both to the preparation of returns and
negotiating administrative settlements, the lawyer is under a duty
not to mislead the Internal Revenue Service deliberately and af-
firmatively, either by misstatements or by silence or by permitting
his client to mislead. The difficult problem arises where the client
has in fact misled but without the lawyer's knowledge or partici-
pation. In that situation, upon discovery of the misrepresentation,
the lawyer must advise the client to correct the statement; if the
client refuses, the lawyer's obligation depends on all the circum-
stances.
"Fundamentally, subject to the restrictions of the attorney-
client privilege imposed by [the duty to keep client confidences]
the lawyer may have the duty to withdraw from the matter. If
for example, under all the circumstances, the lawyer believes that
the service relies on him as corroborating statements of his client
which he knows to be false, then he is under a duty to disassociate
23. ABA Opinion 287 (1953).
24. Ass'n of the Bar Opinion 673 (1945). Cf. United States v. Ford, 9 F.2d
990, 991 (D. Mont. 1925).
25. Although a lawyer may simultaneously serve as advocate or adviser, the
two roles are essentially different. EC 7-3.
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himself from any such reliance unless it is obvious that the very
act of disassociation would have the effect of violating [the duty
to keep client confidences]. Even then, however, if a direct ques-
tion is put to the lawyer, he must at least advise the service that
he is not in a position to answer."
The theories advanced by the SEC in the National Student Marketing
case are contrary in spirit to the foregoing principles, most clearly to
the extent that violations of the SEC's proxy rules are alleged. The
complained-of soliciting material was disseminated prior to the time
PMM or the defendant law firms were aware of possible problems in
the presentation of the May 31, 1969 financials. Yet, the SEC is claim-
ing that Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act was violated by the sub-
sequent failure of White & Case and Lord, Bissel & Brook to insist
upon resolicitation of revised financials or to withdraw from represen-
tation of NSMC and Interstate and inform on their clients to the SEC.
The basic premise of the SEC in making such a charge is that an at-
torney to a corporation has a higher duty to the investing public than
to management or existing shareholders, and should compel compli-
ance by management with the securities acts by making public, or at
least disclosing to the SEC, violations of the law, particularly in the
area of SEC filings. 26 Further, since the failure to withdraw a false or
misleading financial statement in an SEC filing is viewed by the SEC
as a continuing violation, attorneys could be placed in the position of
revealing past violations of law by their clients, as well as preventing
present or future violations.
Distinctions between Attorneys and Accountants
The National Student Marketing complaint can be viewed as part
of an SEC program to expand its jurisdiction over professionals who
have public companies as clients. Recently, the SEC has instituted ac-
tions against banks and even a public relations firm, as well as ac-
countants and attorneys. 27 At the same time, the SEC seems to place
accountants and attorneys in a separate class, and to hold them to simi-
lar standards of conduct. The breach of duty alleged against White &
Case and Lord, Bissel & Brook in the National Student Marketing case
is essentially the same as that alleged against PMM. However salutatory
26. In this connection, it should be noted that Canon 5 of the ABA Code states
that
"A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation ... owes his allegiance
to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, repre-
sentative, or other person connected with the entity."
27. In Korholz, Investment Co. Act Release No. 7034 (Mar. 3, 1972), theSEC named four banks as respondents in administrative proceedings and charged
them with aiding and abetting violations of the Investment Company Act of 1940.
See also, Southern California First Nat'l Bank of San Diego, Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 9289 (Aug. 16, 1971). In SEC v. Pig 'N Whistle Corp., CCHFED. SEC. L. REP. 93,384 (N.D. I11. 1972), a broad and unusual injunction.
was obtained against a public relations firm.
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it may be to hold attorneys responsible for SEC filings which they pre-
pare or transmit, and for opinion letters issued in securities transac-
tions, the SEC is likening the function of a securities lawyer to that of
an independent certified accountant. Although some similarities exist
between these two types of professionals, the function of an inde-
pendent accountant is different from the function of counsel to an is-
suer of securities.
One crucial difference is that there is no accountant-client privilege
recognized in the federal securities laws. 28 Further, although an attor-
ney is directed by Canon 5 of the ABA Code to exercise independent
professional judgment on behalf of a client, he is nevertheless essen-
tially an agent and adversary. Certification is a material fact which
must be performed by an "independent" accountant because the pur-
pose of certification under the securities laws is "the submission to an
independent and impartial mind of the accounting practises and poli-
cies of registrants. ' 29 In order to insure the integrity of financial state-
ments filed with the SEC, and the independence of accountants, the
SEC has adopted fairly elaborate regulations and policies concerning
the certification of financial statements.30 Also, an accountant is an
"expert" under Section 11 (a) of the Securities Act, whereas an attor-
ney is not.31 An attorney's opinion is not based upon the same type of
independent investigation as is an accountant's certificate, and it is
therefore a different and more limited imprimatur.
In a case in which the SEC held that an accountant who is also an
attorney for a registrant is not "independent" under the SEC's rules,
the distinction between an accountant and an attorney was stated as
follows:
"Though owing a public responsibility, an attorney in acting
as the client's advisor, defender, advocate and confidant enters
into a personal relationship in which his principal concern is with
the interests and rights of his client. The requirement of the Act
of certification by an independent accountant, on the other hand,
is intended to secure for the benefit of public investors the de-
tached objectivity of a disinterested person."'32
28. Basch v. Talley Industries, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,364 (S.D. N.Y.
1971).
29. Cornucopia Gold Mines, 1 S.E.C. 364, 367 (1936).
30. Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. §210; Accounting Series Releases, 17 C.F.R.
§211. See, RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Chs. 2, 21
(2d ed. 1966). The standards for independence required of attorneys and ac-
countants are different. It is not considered improper or unethical for an at-
torney who represents a corporation on an annual retainer to serve as director
of the corporation, provided he does not vote or influence the vote on the matter
or amount of his retainer. Ass'n of the Bar Opinion 611 (1942). The SEC,
however, will not recognize as "independent" an accountant who is a director
of any corporation, or parent or subsidiary of any corporation. 17 C.F.R. §210.2-
01(b).
31. Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 683 (S.D. N.Y.
1968).
32. American Finance Co., 40 S.E.C. 1043, 1049 (1962).
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The extent to which the SEC may now be trying to blur this distinction
remains to be seen. Hopefully, the legitimate public interest in preserv-
ing the confidential relationship between attorney and client will be
regarded as more important than the SEC's apparent intention of en-
listing the aid of private practitioners to implement enforcement of the
securities laws.
